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Azerbaijan, like many resource-rich countries, decided to set up a sovereign wealth fund in
order to avoid income volatility, to achieve intergenerational equity and to transform
resource wealth into more productive assets. Azerbaijan established the State Oil Fund of
the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ) in late 1999 to accumulate income from hydrocarbon
exports. SOFAZ has gradually become the leading part of the country's public ﬁnance
system. Azerbaijan was the ﬁrst country to fulﬁll all requirements of the Extractive In-
dustries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international agreement to implement global
standards of transparency in the resource extracting sectors. However, SOFAZ's contribu-
tion to an effective resource revenue management and long-run economic development is
still questionable: transparency applies only to the income side of Azerbaijan's oil fund
while the expenditure side remains opaque. Unlimited and unconditional transfers from
SOFAZ to the state budget have threatened ﬁscal sustainability and the overall macro-
economic equilibrium.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Resource-rich countries encounter speciﬁc challenges
such as intergenerational equity of resource distribution,
long-term macroeconomic stabilisation and ﬁscal sustain-
ability. Institutional responses to the speciﬁc ﬁscal chal-
lenges in oil-exporting countries included conservative oil
price assumptions in the budget, the establishment of oil
stabilisation and savings funds and ﬁscal rules.
Oil and gas producing Azerbaijan, like many resource-
rich countries, decided to set up a sovereign wealth fund
(SWF) in order to respond to ﬁscal challenges, to avoidearch project on do-
Caspian region with
(Germany).
arch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. Prodincome volatility, to achieve intergenerational equity and
to transform resource wealth into more productive assets.
To realise these goals the ﬁscal sustainability of such a SWF
is of great importance. Fiscal sustainability is given when
total public spending equals non-oil revenues plus the
return on the present net value of future oil revenues. Oil-
rich countries can achieve ﬁscal sustainability if they
develop a ﬁscal system able to generate enough oil-related
revenues to ﬁnance the non-oil budget deﬁcit in the long-
run.
Azerbaijan established the State Oil Fund of the Republic
of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) in late 1999 to accumulated income
from its hydrocarbon exports. SOFAZ has gradually become
the leading part of the country's public ﬁnance system. But
the organizational set up is not the only pre-condition for
ﬁscal sustainability, there is also a need for ﬁscal policy
rules adequately responding to oil price shocks and
resulting income volatility. In order to avoid spending in-
consistencies and macroeconomic shocks on different
production capacity, resource reserves, market priceuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2 The term ‘Dutch disease’ broadly refers to the harmful consequences
of large, but perhaps temporary, inﬂux of foreign currency into an
economy on exchange rates and eventually on trade balances, domestic
production, and the availability and costs of credit. A large inﬂux of
foreign currency from natural resource exports can have serious re-
percussions on important segments of a country's economy, as the
appreciation of the local currency diminishes the competitiveness of non-
natural resource sectors, resulting in their contraction. Real exchange rate
appreciation impedes economic diversiﬁcation and increases dependence
on volatile commodity markets, and thus there are likely to be signiﬁcant
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resource-rich countries have to apply diverse ﬁscal rules.
These ﬁscal rules play an essential role for the optimal
distribution of natural resource revenues. Notwithstanding
that the government of Azerbaijan ofﬁcially adopted the
‘constant real expenditures’ principle in 2004, in reality
unlimited and unconditional transfers from SOFAZ to the
state budget have threatened ﬁscal sustainability, effective
revenue management and the overall macroeconomic
equilibrium. In recent years, reckless spending by the
government and a procyclical ﬁscal pattern were major
factors jeopardizing ﬁscal sustainability. The lack of effec-
tive management of the increasing oil and gas revenues is
still one of the major challenges for the government. That is
why the main hypothesis of this article is that SOFAZ's
contribution to prudent ﬁscal policies depends on the
overall quality of institutions and the public ﬁnancial
management system in Azerbaijan.
A sustainable ﬁscal policy must take into account the
volatile nature of revenues for safeguarding the national
economy and the state budget against external shocks and
price ﬂuctuations. The aim of this article is to analyse the
spending behaviour of SOFAZ and the government in terms
of ﬁscal sustainability throughout the almost 15 years of
SOFAZ's existence. This article investigates quantitatively
and qualitatively whether the government's spending of oil
and gas revenues e especially through SOFAZ e promotes
long-term ﬁscal sustainability. The article starts with a brief
outline of main deﬁnitions and indicators of ﬁscal sus-
tainability. It then explains the analytically distinct patterns
of possible links between ﬁscal sustainability and SWFs.
Different ﬁscal rules applied in oil-exporting countries like
‘permanent income hypothesis’, ‘bird-in-hand’ and oil price
assumptions are analysed in regard to their relevance for
Azerbaijan. A brief conclusion draws out the implications of
the analysis for the future of revenue management policy
and ﬁscal sustainability.
2. Deﬁnition and indicators of ﬁscal sustainability
Sturm, Gurtner & Alegre (2009: 18) describe ﬁscal sus-
tainability for oil-exporting countries as the guarantee that
in the ‘post-oil period the same amount of public goods or
level of expenditure can be provided as in the oil period
without resorting to deﬁcit ﬁnancing of public expendi-
ture.’ They distinguish ﬁscal sustainability and intergener-
ational equity, because ‘if oil revenues are replaced by tax
revenues, this would ensure ﬁscal sustainability but not
necessarily intergenerational equity’. According to the
OECD (2009: 86), ﬁscal sustainability ‘encompasses gov-
ernment solvency, continued stable economic growth,
stable taxes and intergenerational fairness’. In other word,
sustainable ﬁscal policy is a policy that can be realized
without any major changes in tax and spending patterns.1
The development of the primary balance of the state
budget (i.e., the difference between primary revenue and
primary expenses) is a useful indicator to evaluate ﬁscal
sustainability. Another important indicator is the ﬁscal gap,1 See also Schick, 2005.deﬁned as the ‘permanent spending decrease or revenue
increase that would be necessary at a point in time to
ensure a speciﬁed debt-to-GDP constraint is met at the end
of the projection horizon’ (Bell, Blick, Parkyn, Rodway, &
Vowles, 2010: 74).
Validating ﬁscal sustainability for resource-rich coun-
tries requires distinguishing between the resource and
non-resource ﬁscal deﬁcits. The size of the non-resource
primary deﬁcit and the rules for allocating current
resource revenues from the SWF to the budget are very
important for resource-rich countries. Fiscal sustainability
analysis for these countries means exploring the inﬂuence
of the non-resource primary ﬁscal deﬁcit and SWF alloca-
tion rules on the distribution of public debt. In the case of
Azerbaijan, the share of external debt stock in gross do-
mestic product (GDP) declined while the share of SOFAZ's
transfers to budget increased rapidly.
Generally, the problem of ﬁscal sustainability is espe-
cially severe in resource-rich countries because huge rev-
enue inﬂows from the export of oil, gas or minerals can lead
to an increased dependence on a highly volatile source of
income creating two problems: (1) income volatility, and
(2) exchange rate distortions by the inﬂow of resource
revenues (‘Dutch disease’).2 Therefore, high spending of
current resource income converts income volatility into
highly volatile expenditure with very serious economic
consequences.
Despite the fact that there is no commonly accepted
unique model of ﬁscal rules about optimal spending be-
haviours of governments of resource-rich countries,
different applied models have already been analysed and
categorized empirically. Iacono (2012: 2) emphasizes that
effective ﬁscal rules should be ‘backed by a strong political
will and complemented by administrative reforms, also
strong costs of deviations from the ﬁscally responsible
behavior’. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006: 448) point
out that one outcome of a resource boom for the resource
dependent economies could be ‘highly dysfunctional state
behavior, particularly large public sectors and unsustain-
able budgetary policies’.
There are a number of approaches on how to cope with
natural resource revenues (cf. e.g., Economic Research
Center, 2009). The most widely used approach to man-
aging volatile resource revenues is the permanent income
(PI) approach, under which a volatile revenue ﬂow is used
to ﬁnance a constant stream of expenditure. This approach
states that governments should try to smooth out con-
sumption over time in line with permanent income. As aadjustment costs in moving back to agriculture or into manufacturing
following resource depletion or price slumps (Bornhorst, Gupta, &
Thornton, 2009: 439; Davis & Tilton, 2005: 236).
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should be equal to the current annuity value of expected oil
wealth (Segura, 2006). In this concept, after depletion of
natural resources, the government will ﬁnance its future
expenditure particularly based on the gaining from past
savings. The main shortcoming of the PI approach is that it
disregards future expenditure liabilities related to espe-
cially the ageing of population, i.e., increasing pension and
health care costs.
That is why some resource-rich countries like Norway
have opted for the real income approache or ‘bird-in-hand’
approachewhich allows consumption only of the resource
revenues which have already been liquidated, i.e., the
expenditure ﬁnanced from resource income cannot exceed
the investment income of the SWF. States that choose the
real income approach convert the income from the sale of
natural resources into ﬁnancial assets and only spend the
interest that emanates from these assets. As it has a
restrictive nature, this track ensures that actual oil income
is kept for the use of future generations. This spending rule
is not directly linked to oil price ﬂuctuations, as only the
income earned on ﬁnancial assets is spent. In this case
government consumption will be inﬂuenced only by
changes in accumulated ﬁnancial assets, not by changes in
the current value of revenues.
However, some studies argue that this approach ‘is
inappropriate for low-income countries […] rich in natural
resources, as it ignores that these countries are both capital
and credit constrained’ (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte,
Poplawski-Ribeiro, & Richmond, 2012: 4).
The third approach adopted in some resource-rich post-
Soviet countries (e.g., Kazakhstan and Russia) is the long-
term price rule where resource revenues are transferred
from the SWF to the budget in an amount equal to the
revenues generated above a speciﬁed long-term price; that
is, a long-term price for the exported resources is deter-
mined and all export proceeds that exceed that price are
transferred from the SWF to the state budget. However, this
approach is not sustainable beyond the phase of oil and
minerals production. Once resource revenues end, the
economy may experience a severe negative shock and debt
may increase to compensate for the lack of resource reve-
nues (cf. e.g., Bauer, 2014).
Due to the limited availability of oil, gas, and minerals
revenues, intergenerational fairness is a major issue for
natural resource exporters. If the highly volatile nature of
resource revenues were to translate into highly volatile
spending levels and associated volatility of the real ex-
change rate, the impact would be like a tax on private in-
vestment, with negative consequences for economic
growth (Van Wijnbergen & Budina, 2011: 662e663). Fiscal
policy in most oil-exporting countries has been expan-
sionary over the past years of high oil prices. Fiscal
expansion has added to inﬂationary pressure, and mone-
tary policy has been constrained in tackling inﬂation as a
result of prevailing exchange rate regimes (Sturm et al.,
2009: 18). According to Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy
(2010: 4) the degree of pro-cyclicality in ﬁscal policy is
high for low-income countries and conversely low for high-
income countries. Frankel (2010: 22) deﬁnes one of the
crucial reasons for pro-cyclical spending that ‘thegovernment cannot resist the temptation or political
pressure to increase spending proportionately’. A wide-
spread institutional solution in oil-exporting countries to
promote ﬁscal sustainability and anti-cyclical ﬁscal policy is
to set up a SWF. But the evidence suggests that SWFs can
perform poorly due to low overall institutional quality in
the respective country, imperfect diversiﬁcation of the in-
vestment portfolio and poor corporate governance.
3. Fiscal sustainability and sovereign wealth funds
(SWF)
SWFs are government-owned investment funds oper-
ating in private ﬁnancial markets; some are funded from
ﬁscal surpluses or foreign exchange reserves, while others
are funded through borrowings from the market. Almost
half of the existing SWFs operate as separate legal entities,
while the rest exists as a dependent entity within the
Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank of the respective
country. The objectives of SWFs range from ﬁscal stabili-
sation to general savings for future generations to covering
expected future pension expenditures. Stabilisation and
savings funds are common among countries with large
natural resource endowments because they are able to
mitigate volatile world market prices as well as a ﬂuctu-
ating and/or declining resource production. Savings funds
are concerned with intergenerational equity and transfers.
Intergenerational equity focuses on beneﬁting the current
and future generations as equally as possible from the
country's natural wealth. This may be done by setting up an
endowment type fund that converts a ﬁnite or extractive
asset with an inﬁnite string of ﬁnancial cash ﬂows to
beneﬁt the present and all future generations. In some
economies, saving assets abroad in an SWF can assist in
mitigating ‘Dutch disease’ symptoms and related macro-
economic consequences. At times, stabilisation funds grow
beyond what is needed for stabilisation purposes, espe-
cially when prices are ampliﬁed up an elongated period,
and are consequently redesigned as stabilisation and sav-
ings funds.
The coordination of fund operations with the overall
national ﬁscal policy has been difﬁcult because SWFs have
not only economic incentives, but also political ones. Funds'
top managements have to evade serious ﬁscal risks for
SWFswhichwill ensue if the government views their assets
as free resources to be used ad hoc to cover various ﬁscal
needs (cf. e.g., Public Finance Monitoring Center, Khazar
University & Revenue Watch Institute, 2011). Sovereign
wealth funds ‘are least needed when institutions are
strong; but they are least likely to work in precisely those
institutionally weak environments where they appear to be
most needed’. When policy-makers design natural resource
revenue funds they should ﬁrst consider ‘the political in-
centives in their country, and attempt to design fund rules
that not only approximate the optimal ﬁscal policy, but,
more importantly, create political incentives (or at least
mitigate political disincentives) for abiding by that policy’
(Humphreys & Sandbu, 2007: 226, 227).
In light of this dilemma, the decision whether or not to
establish a SWF e and what kind of fund to design e has to
be made. A ﬁrst position claims that SWFs are not
3 See ‘Mission, goals and philosophy’, http://www.oilfund.az/en/
content/3, last accessed 23 January 2015.
4 Azerbaijan joined the EITI as early as 2004 and is actively working
under this framework, which stresses the importance of transparency
and accountability issues. Recent assessments have revealed that
Azerbaijan is relatively compliant with all EITI principles and so the
country became the ﬁrst full EITI member (Aslanli, 2012: 239).
5 For a detailed description of SOFAZ see Aslanli, 2012.
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cessful functioning of these funds exist, then resource
revenues or ﬁscal surpluses can be managed without them
within the budgetary process. The second position suggests
that even if it is impossible to create ideal conditions, the
existence of SWFs could prevent excessive spending. In
particular, governance, transparency, and accountability
remain important in the areas of macroeconomic devel-
opment and the design and implementation of ﬁscal policy
(especially in the context of public savings). SWFs can
foster the control of revenue management and the prudent
intergenerational and intra-generational allocation of the
ﬁnite national wealth. In macroeconomic terms, strong
governance and the provision of adequate transparency
and accountability would foster ﬁscal sustainability of the
respective countries, further enforcing their international
positioning (Humphreys & Sandbu, 2007: 213).
In order to enable ﬁscal sustainability, transfers from the
fund to the state budget should be guided by the principle
of maintaining the real value of government wealth. De-
posit and withdrawal rules should be deﬁned by the laws
that establish the arrangement. These rules need to be
clearly speciﬁed, but should also provide some ﬂexibility in
case of adverse conditions. They should be deﬁned in line
with country needs, and it is important that countries
clearly state what those rules are when the fund or account
is set up and then abide by them. For instance, stabilisation
fund arrangements or accounts are more likely to be
needed on short notice, their withdrawals are somewhat
more uncertain. For a savings account, the presumption is
that withdrawals are predictable and not to be used soon; it
should therefore be capitalized second (Ghura et al., 2012).
The asset allocation of the fund should begin with a
conservative, very liquid and low-risk, investment portfo-
lio, especially since at ﬁrst investment expertise may not
yet be fully developed. It is important to ensure that the
asset allocation strategies of and between various portfo-
lios is ﬂexible enough to ensure that the withdrawals that
may be needed for government's liquidity needs can bemet
without incurring penalising day-to-day borrowing or
other ﬁnancial costs. Withdrawals from stabilisation funds
tend to be deﬁned to meet speciﬁc budgetary or funding
targets. Deposit and withdrawal rules need to be consistent
with the objectives of each SWF and the country's use of
the ﬁscal balances, and all expenses should be captured in
the budget. Deposit andwithdrawal rules are often detailed
in the legislation establishing a fund. In trying to delink the
ﬁscal stance from natural resource revenue volatility, the
draft legislation setting up the SWF should link with-
drawals from the fund to the medium-term ﬁscal frame-
work (IMF, 2012).
The objectives of the fund need to be aligned with the
long-term development vision of the resource-rich coun-
try. Integration of resource revenue management through
SWFs with ﬁscal and monetary policy is critical to manage
risks and avoid banking crises. Mobilizing ﬁscal space
created by an SWF through public and private investment
in the domestic economy is critical for long-term stability
and development. Integration with the state budget is
necessary to increase transparency and align revenue
management with development strategy matters for SWFs.4. The role of SOFAZ in ﬁscal sustainability
The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, SOFAZ, was established
in 1999 and began operating in 2001with an ofﬁcial, legally
extra-budgetary fund status combining stabilization, ster-
ilization and saving functions. SOFAZ's revenues include
the proceeds from the sales of Azerbaijan's share in hy-
drocarbons, transit fees, bonus payments, and acreage fees,
revenues from the management of the Fund's assets and
other revenues, as detailed for the year 2013 in Table 2.
The Fund has three objectives: (1) preserve macroeco-
nomic stability by decreasing Azerbaijan's dependence on
oil revenues and stimulate the development of the non-oil
sector; (2) accumulate and preserve revenues for future
generations; and (3) ﬁnance major national projects for
socio-economic development.3 Simultaneously, SOFAZ has
worked on the implementation of the standards of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in
Azerbaijan to promote regular reporting and an inclusive
approach to transparency rules.4 A signiﬁcant amount of
information is available on the Fund's investments. SOFAZ
limits investment risk through strict target asset allocation
and a Supervisory Board oversees the Fund's activities on
behalf of Azerbaijan's president.5
However, a lack of withdrawal rules, extra-budgetary
spending directly by the Fund and a lack of independent
oversight have become the Fund's most signiﬁcant gover-
nance challenges.
Financing major national projects to support socio-
economic progress and ensuring intergenerational
equality with regard to the country's resource wealth by
accumulating and preserving oil and gas revenues for
future generations are SOFAZ's main goals. With regard to
the ﬁrst goal, notwithstanding that these funds have been
appropriated without parliamentary oversight and that
spending is generally non-transparent, the objective has
been more or less met. However, the second goal of
ensuring the fair allocation of resource wealth across gen-
erations has been neglected so far. Priority has been given
to spending revenues instead of accumulating or investing
them for long-term growth (Tsani, Ahmadov, & Aslanli,
2010). During the years 2001e2013, inﬂows to the Fund
totalled US$101 billion, with 36% representing savings and
64% spending. The Fund has played a considerable role in
the process of maintaining ﬁscal stability. In 2013, transfers
from the Fund accounted for 58% of total state budget
revenues (State Oil Fund for the Republic of Azerbaijan,
2014: 30e31). As Table 1 indicates for several years in a
row more than 90% of the Funds revenues have been
transferred to the state budget, i.e., have been spent.
With that the government's rate of spending has
violated the principle of saving a minimum of 25% of
Table 1
SOFAZ's transfers to the state budget.
Year Transfers to state budget
(millions AZN)
Growth
dynamics
Transfers as
share in GDP
Transfers as share of
the state budget
Transfers as share of
SOFAZ's expenditures
2003 100 d 1.3% 8.2% 41.0%
2004 130 30.0% 1.5% 8.6% 77.0%
2005 150 15.4% 1.2% 7.2% 70.0%
2006 585 290.0% 3.2% 15.1% 59.6%
2007 585 0.0% 2.1% 9.7% 55.1%
2008 1100 88.0% 9.5% 35.3% 88.5%
2009 4915 346.8% 14.2% 47.6% 92.8%
2010 5915 20.3% 15.6% 51.9% 90.5%
2011 9203 55.6% 17.7% 57.3% 93.7%
2012 9905 7.6% 18.3% 57.3% 93.6%
2013 11350 14.6% 19.7% 58.2% 92.3%
Source: State Oil Fund for the Republic of Azerbaijan (2014) Annual report 2013. Baku: SOFAZ, pp. 30e31, http://www.oilfund.az/uploads/annual_2013en.
pdf; author's calculations.
Table 2
SOFAZ revenues and expenditures (2013, in thousand manats).
Indicators Amount
Revenues 13,600,400.1
1. Proceeds from sales of Azerbaijan's share of hydrocarbons (deducts the costs of hydrocarbons transportation,
banking expenses, customs clearances, independent surveyor, marketing and insurance costs, and also exclusive of the
revenues from the SOCAR's share in the projects of which it is an investor, shareholder or partner)
13,108,016.4
2. Revenues from SOFAZ's asset management 480,559.5
3. Revenues from transportation of oil and gas through the territory of Azerbaijan 8,063.8
4. Bonuses paid by investors when signing and fulﬁlling oil and gas agreements 1,850.1
5. Acreage fees paid by foreign investors for use of the contract areas for the development of hydrocarbon resources 1,831.9
6. Other revenues and incomes 78.4
Expenditures 12,302,663.5
1. Transfer to the 2013 state budget of Azerbaijan 11,350,000.0
2. Financing of Azerbaijan's share in the construction of the ‘STAR’ oil reﬁnery complex in Turkey 372,590.0
3. Financing the improvement of the social and economic conditions of refugees and internally displaced persons 299,990.2
4. Financing the reconstruction of the Samur-Absheron irrigation system 173,933.6
5. Administrative expenses of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan 47,470.2
6. Financing the ‘State programme on the education of Azerbaijani youth abroad in the years 2007e2015’ 33,007.8
7. Financing the ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway’ construction project 25,671.7
Source: ‘Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Execution of the Budget of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2013’, 22
May 2014, http://www.oilfund.az/en_US/huequqi-senedler/fondun-buedcesine-dair/fondun-budcesine-dair-22052014.asp.
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on the management of oil and gas revenues’, which covers
the period 2005e2025 and establishes the principles for
the use of oil and gas revenues and the expenditure policy
for this period.6 As a result, SOFAZ has played a contro-
versial role in ﬁscal sustainability in the state economy
because the amount of SOFAZ's transfers to the state budget
has signiﬁcantly increased since 2008.
The major areas of spending by SOFAZ, as detailed for
2013 in Table 2, were transfers to the state budget, the
funding of social, infrastructure, and human capital devel-
opment programmes, and administrative expenses. Major
national scale projects, various state programmes and
infrastructure projects receive ﬁnancial support simulta-
neously from both the state budget and SOFAZ's budget
which complicates public ﬁnance management and jeop-
ardises ﬁscal sustainability (State Oil Fund for the Republic
of Azerbaijan, 2013: 15, 18).6 ‘Long-term strategy on the management of oil and gas revenues’,
approved by decree of the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan No. 128,
dated 27 September 2004, pp. 2e3, http://www.oilfund.az/uploads/5-
eng-long-term.pdf, last accessed 23 January 2015.Estimates by theWorld Bank, consistent with forecasted
revenues, show that the level of permanent income that
could be spent annually amount to US$7.7 billion (in con-
stant 2007 US Dollars), i.e., 31% of Azerbaijan's 2007 GDP or
69% of non-oil GDP. The share of the state budget ﬁnanced
by petroleum revenues has increased every year since 2007
from 9.7% to 60.5% in 2012. Oil revenues in 2024 will be
about US$8 billion less than in 2015. The return on SOFAZ
investments is between 0.75% and 4.5%, therefore, the in-
terest does not compensate for signiﬁcant public spending
out of SOFAZ. Non-oil growth in Azerbaijan is as high as
10%, but driven by government expenditure rather than
private sector investment and, with declining oil revenues
in the near future, is therefore unsustainable (Ibadoglu,
Alasgarov, & Bayramov, 2013: 16).
SOFAZ's ﬁnancial ﬂows are subject to regular and
comprehensive internal audits. The supervisory board,
consisting of representatives from both the executive and
the legislature branch, is appointed by the president to
oversee the Fund's activities. It reviews its annual budget,
annual reports, ﬁnancial statements and audits. SOFAZ's
ﬁnances are also subject to a regular and independent
external audit that meets international standards. Funds
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reserves.7
However, common oversight mechanisms or safeguards
are not present in Azerbaijan: the parliament has no formal
oversight and lacks independence fromthe executive branch.
International oversight institutions, such as the World Bank
or the InternationalMonetary Fund,donot routinelymonitor
the Fund's management; de facto constraints on civil society
organizations to advocate freely limit their ability to provide
citizen oversight of Fund activities. While much information
on the Fund's activities is available, oversight bodies in
Azerbaijan are generally not independent, limiting the use-
fulness of this information for promoting good governance
(National Resource Governance Institute & Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment, 2013).
As oil is a ﬁnite resource, its exploitation and eventual
depletion is worthwhile only if its export proceeds are
invested and lead to higher income in the long-run. The
question in Azerbaijan is whether resource revenues are
spent on projects and in sectors that will lead to higher long-
runnational income. If not, itmaybemorebeneﬁciary to save
a larger proportion of revenues. After all, if citizens will not
beneﬁt from long-lasting roads, electricity, clean water, ac-
cess to credit, education andhealth services, not tomention a
growing non-oil economy that lifts all boats, then future
generations should at least beneﬁt from the ﬁnancial returns
of investing oil revenues. When oil production starts
decliningand/orglobal oil pricesdrop, either thegovernment
will be forced to run a budget deﬁcit or drawmore funds out
of SOFAZ. These options are unsustainable and they could
lead to a debt crisis,whichwould lead tohigh costs and lower
standard of living for future generations, or a return to pre-oil
levels of development and poverty (Ibadoglu et al., 2013).
Beyond borrowing and drawing money from SOFAZ, a
third option would be to raise tax revenues from the non-
oil sector, but to date this has proven difﬁcult since non-
oil non-government growth remains weak and non-oil
tax revenues linger steadily around 20% of GDP, much
lower than the 30e45% in most developed countries.
Not only has the government spent more than it has
received, but the share of the state budget ﬁnanced by
petroleum revenues has increased every year since 2007
from 10% to 62%. Few countries in the world are as
resource-dependent as Azerbaijan: Over 70% of Azerbai-
jan's state budget and over 90% of exports come from oil
and gas. At expected rates of production and given proven
reserves, government oil revenue collection will be half of
the US$83.86 billion it is today in just 12 years (World Bank,
2009). Dependency on the oil and gas sector is a particu-
larly severe problem when resource revenues begin to
decline permanently after 2014, oil revenues in 2024 will
be about US$8 billion less than in 2015.
Increased gas revenues will not cover the loss of oil
revenues. This means that without new, large-scale dis-
coveries the government will be hard pressed to ﬁnance
recurrent or capital expenditures unless tax revenues are
raised from other sectors. It is also important to note that7 Cf. ‘General information’, http://www.oilfund.az/en_US/about_found/
idareetme/uemumi-melumat-2.asp, last accessed 23 January 2015.the asset management practices of the Fund clearly do not
exhibit a good track record. Rather, SOFAZ has made a small
return on investment, so asset management clearly is not
an optionwhen it comes to generating alternative revenues
given yields in today's global economy (State Oil Fund for
the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2013: 43).
In summary, Azerbaijan's government spends more
resource revenues than are saved despite declining reve-
nues in the near future. There is overspending relative to
savings and the current level of expenditure growth cannot
be supported by actual or projected revenues. Considering
the amount of oil reserves, slow growth in the non-oil
sector and weak non-oil revenue generation an aggres-
sive budgetary expansion in Azerbaijan cannot be justiﬁed.
Azerbaijan must learn from the experience of other coun-
tries with declining resource bases that have faced tough
public spending choices, debt crises and domestic conﬂict.5. Fiscal sustainability challenges in Azerbaijan
That means Azerbaijan faces serious risks for its ﬁscal
sustainability in a medium to long-term perspective, inﬂu-
enced by oil price ﬂuctuations and declining production
levels of crude oil. Therefore, long-run ﬁscal sustainability is
a critical challenge. Azerbaijan is now encountering the
needs to ensure permanent income and a sustainable ﬁscal
policy based on the non-oil budget. There is the need for a
comprehensive assessment of ﬁscal sustainability over the
entire time horizon through deﬁning the indicators of public
ﬁnance sustainability and identifying main risks on this
issue. In the ‘Long-term strategy on the management of oil
and gas revenues’ the following principles have been adop-
ted concerning the long-term use of oil and gas revenues:
- ‘When forecasting the amount of long-term expendi-
tures from oil and gas revenues, the ‘constant real ex-
penditures’ principle shall be used as a basis and annual
limits shall be set for these expenditures that are to be
made within the period covered by the strategy;
- When incomes from oil and gas revenues peak, at least
25 percent of them shall be saved;
- The regulations adopted for spending oil and gas rev-
enues shall remain unchanged during the effective
period of the long-term strategy on management of oil
and gas revenues and the expenditure limits projected
on the basis of the constant real expenditures principle
shall be observed;
- The volume of medium-term expenditures shall be
determined based on the non-oil deﬁcit (the difference
between revenues and expenditures of the consoli-
dated budget of the country, excluding the oil sector)
and taking account of the long-term expenditure limit.
Sharp year to year ﬂuctuations in expenditures are
undesirable and the non-oil deﬁcit may not be abruptly
changed’.88 ‘Long-term strategy on the management of oil and gas revenues’,
approved by decree of the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan No. 128,
dated 27 September 2004, pp. 2e3, http://www.oilfund.az/uploads/5-
eng-long-term.pdf, last accessed 23 January 2015.
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element of the ﬁscal framework in Azerbaijan is a non-oil
balance guideline (adopted in 2004) consistent with con-
stant real consumption out of oil wealth. But effective
application of the above-mentioned rules has never been
realized. Instead, the government relied on an ad-hoc
balanced budget complemented by SOFAZ transfers (Kyle,
2014:65).
The IMF's Consultation Mission statement for
Azerbaijan reported on 12 March 2013 that ‘scaling down
government spending, resisting pressures for a mid-year
supplementary budget, and guarding against evasion
from recent tax amendments would reduce ﬁscal vulner-
abilities, and reforms to strengthen non-oil revenue and
rationalize public spending would help support the credi-
bility of the new framework’ (IMF, 2013). SOFAZ can be
successful in achieving efﬁcient resource management
when there are well-designed funding and withdrawal
rules which are consistent with stated goals. Clear
accountability procedures among the different levels of
SOFAZ governance, and to the public, are important in
order to prevent misuse of public resources and to gain
public support for the Fund and its objectives. The success
of SOFAZ is contingent upon responsible investment pol-
icies that are consistent with its policy purpose.
It is highly advisable to combine whatever ﬁscal deﬁcit
strategy is chosen with (a) implied target levels for net
debt, and (b) a rule that any excess over that target level
will result in a smaller non-oil deﬁcit during the next
period by a given percentage of that excess. The increasing
amount of transfers from SOFAZ to the state budget ne-
cessitates the acceptance of ﬁscal policy guidelines based
on clear principles for the relations between Fund and state
budget.
Additionally, it is important to take into consideration
all relevant monetary and ﬁscal factors during allocations,
as well as transfers from SOFAZ. One of the crucial issues for
oil-rich economies is the interaction between ﬁscal and
monetary policy (especially, for the nominal interest rate),
also proper division of tasks between the central bank and
ﬁscal authorities (Harding & van der Ploeg, 2009: 34).
There is a simple reason why natural resource revenue-
fuelled Funds do usually not contribute to better ﬁscal
policy in those countries which are heavily dependent on
oil and gas exports.
The reason is that the economic considerations, which
usually drive a fund's decisions, support only a speciﬁc
ﬁscal policy and are silent on what is the right institutional
framework for implementing that policy. However, the
political economy of power rivalry and elite struggles can
create incentives for rapid overspending of natural resource
revenues relative to the ideal levels of expenditure. These
adverse effects are strongest when institutions and policies
are otherwise weak, where political and economic power is
highly concentrated, where transparency is comparatively
limited, and where there are risks of rapid changes of
government. Political actors are more likely to direct oil
resources for clientelistic purposes in a political regime
with weak institutions. All these factors including sporadic
imperious attitudes, power rivalry, and weak oversight
apply to Azerbaijan (Humphreys & Sandbu, 2007: 226).Frankel (2010) points out contradictory results of different
empirical studies about links between economic depen-
dence on oil or minerals and authoritarian government. But
theoretically, autocratic regimes aremore likely to establish
a SWF relative to democratic ones and ‘therefore, a ruler
that expects to stay in power for a while, may very well set
up an SWF in anticipation of being able to use at least some
of the proceeds for private use in the future’ (Carpantier &
Vermeulen, 2014: 7). Another dimension is the quality of
institutions. Studies proof the important role of institu-
tional quality in turning natural resources into economic
wealth including through SWFs. Lücke (2010: 22) points
out that the oil fund in Azerbaijan strengthens ‘presidential
control over oil-related revenues to the detriment of
parliament’ and that there are no legal provisions restrict-
ing the president's discretionary power regarding the use
of oil revenues. Transferring control over SOFAZ from
president to parliament can improve the ﬁscal relationship
between the Fund and the state budget.
6. Conclusion
Fiscal sustainability is the ability to continue current
level of spending in the future without any serious change
regarding public services and taxation and also without
continually increasing the debt level. Governments can
adopt ﬁscal institutions and ﬁscal rules to deal with income
volatility caused by a high dependence on resource reve-
nues. A common and important feature in this context is
the creation of a SWF like SOFAZwhich can accumulate and
release resource revenues as deemed necessary.
In resource-rich countries, ﬁscal rules can assist to
contain spending pressures and smooth income volatility,
but they are highly insufﬁcient to build ﬁscal buffers. In the
case of Azerbaijan, there is a broad consensus that
continued large increases in public expenditures are not
sustainable and that a lack of ﬁscal sustainability can cause
serious risks for Azerbaijan. It's quite large oil and gas re-
sources have earned Azerbaijan large ﬁscal revenues in last
10 years but future ﬁscal revenues from oil and gas exports
might be lower than currently expected due to declining
production and the development of global market prices.
A sound management of Azerbaijan's resource revenues
requires a ﬁscal framework to smooth public spending for
different reasons (i.e., intergenerational equity, preserving
macroeconomic stability, maintaining spending efﬁciency).
Non-oil revenues have been weak due to low non-oil real
economic growth, tax exemptions and problems in small
and medium entrepreneurship, while oil revenues have
remained strong.
The ﬁrst issue to consider is howmuch of the oil money
to save or accrue in the SWF, and howmuch to consume or
allocate for state budget expansion. This requires an anal-
ysis of where that money will provide the best long-term
beneﬁt for society. Empirical evidence and expert opin-
ions suggest that transfers from SOFAZ to the state budget
in Azerbaijan should be based on stringent ﬁscal rule taking
into account the Fund's total assets (Ahmadov, Tsani, &
Aslanli, 2009). Where the SWF's activities have signiﬁcant
direct domestic macroeconomic implications, those activ-
ities should be closely coordinated with the domestic ﬁscal
K. Aslanli / Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2015) 114e121 121and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with
the overall macroeconomic policies. Given the increase of
the budget transfers despite the decline of the proﬁtability
rate of SOFAZ's assets management there is a need to re-
view the coordination of ﬁscal and macroeconomic pol-
icies. It is crucial that in the future the government will be
determined to achieve a non-resource ﬁscal balance with
the help of a consistent programme of diversiﬁcation (cf.
State Oil Fund for the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2013).
These challenges can be partly overcome with the help
of the permanent income approach to spending oil reve-
nues as envisioned by the ‘Long-term strategy on the
management of oil and gas revenues’ in Azerbaijan. If it will
be applied in Azerbaijan, an important beneﬁt would be to
prevent the public ﬁnance system from extreme volatility
stemming from unlimited transfers of SOFAZ to the state
budget, even in the face of high volatility in oil prices or
declining production.
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